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This article examines a theoretically informed case study of the effects of
ﬁnancialisation at the workplace. It focuses in particular on trade union de-recognition
and trade union recognition in the furtherance of ownership interests. The paper
reports on the continued diffusion of investor-owner interests under the private equity
business model which has recently witnessed the AA re-listed on the stock market. It
addresses two research questions. One, how are investor-owner interests secured by
trade union de-recognition and re-recognition? Two, how and why, as a de-recognised
trade union, does the GMB continue to campaign for and represent GMB members
in the AA when the IDU (the independent democratic union) has sole recognition
at the ﬁrm?
1 INTRODUCTION—FINANCIALISATION AND WORKPLACE
OUTCOMES—THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Financialisation can be defined as the costs and consequences of financial innovation
for firms and their employees in the non-financial sector of the economy. This article
provides a theoretically informed case study of financialisation at the workplace
where a firm is captured by a business model associated with new investor-owners
and the ideology of investor and shareholder value (I&SHV). Investor-owners, such
as hedge funds, private equity partnerships and sovereign wealth funds, use innova-
tive and sophisticated investment leverage in the forms of derivatives, junk bonds,
credit default swaps, mortgage backed securitisation of firm level assets and liabilities,
shorting and collateralised debt obligations to acquire (what become) portfolio firms.
More significantly these investor-owners and the ideology and motives and values
central to I&SHV witness the core of financialisation—the endogenous creation of
money, credit and debt—become rooted in the operation of non-financial firms. This
is a contagion effect of financialisation where investor-owners in non-financial firms
use unregulated financial processes associated with leveraged acquisitions to appro-
priate value from a portfolio firm.
A first research question focusses on how and why investor-owner interests pursue
union de-recognition and re-recognition and how direct ownership interests are expe-
rienced by the workforce at the AA. More specifically empirical material is advanced
to reveal how work intensification, performance management and required revenue❒ Correspondence should be addressed to Ian Clark, University of Leicester School of Management Ken
Edwards Building University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, United Kingdom; email: ic70@le.ac.uk
© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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the firm on the stock market. The data show how the GMB union was out
manoeuvred by new investor-owners determined to appropriate value for themselves
at the expense of the workforce. A second research question examines how and why,
as a de-recognised trade union, the GMB continues to campaign for and represent
GMB members in the AA. The GMB does so despite a new break-away union, the
independent democratic union (IDU), and its role and development since 2005 when
it secured sole recognition rights for collective bargaining at the AA.
The study is based on in-depth case study interviews at the GMB, the examination
of archive sources at the GMB union and the Certification Office, adjudication
reports of Employment Tribunal Judgements, the IDU website and the financial
press. The article has four substantive parts. Part one establishes a theoretical
framework centred on a theory of firm level financialisation and transmission
mechanisms between this and employment relations outcomes for workers at the
AA. Part two details the research methods and sources employed in this study. Part
three presents empirical findings and part four interrogates the empirical findings from
the standpoint of the two research questions. The concluding section asks whether the
insights from this study may be generalised beyond the detail of the AA case.2 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
OUTCOMES BEYOND INFERENCE
The emergence of aggressive short-term investor-owners is, as Thelen (2009: 491)
observes, almost completely lost in path dependent approaches to the political
economy of employment relations. In contrast to this the established literature on
financialisation asserts that capital markets increasingly regulate the behaviour of
financialised firms in three ways. First, the ascendency of investor and shareholder
value as a strategy prioritises the interests of investors at the expense of other actors
in the corporation (van der Zwan, 2014). Second this strategy legitimises more aggres-
sive management of corporate assets where new financial objectives, for example high
stock prices and maximising the release of cash flows to shareholders, are being pur-
sued at the expense of other ‘high performance’ goals, (Thompson, 2013). Third and
directly associated capital re-structuring in delayering, downsizing and divestment
fund share-buy-backs but blunt the innovative capabilities of a firm as revenues gen-
erated from these layoffs are not reinvested. The (potential) productivity gains of
‘financialised’ firms are appropriated by shareholder value driven investors at the ex-
pense of retained profit for further investment in innovation (Goyer et al., 2016,
Lapavitatas, 2013). Within the financialisation literature there is, however, less
explicit discussion of how these developments create transmission mechanisms that
produce labour outcomes in employment relations at firm level.
For employment relations researchers the need to better understand broader deve-
lopments such as financialisation and associated financial engineering is clear:
financialisation and investor and shareholder value now drive accumulation strategies
for many firms which prioritise capital market requirements and not those of a wider
group of stakeholders. These strategies and requirements stimulate transmission
mechanisms that have significant employment relations outcomes for workers. Those
researchers who do focus on financialisation as a structural development in capitalism
and who have sought to explain how financialisation interfaces with employment
relations have done so with some success (Appelbaum et al., 2013, Gospel and© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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(2013) identifies ‘breach of implicit contracts’ as empirically observable in portfolio
firms where financialisation is imposed on a business. Gospel and Pendleton (2014)
and Pendleton and Gospel (2014) take a different tack. Focusing on the UK, they
situate the effects of financialisation as in-direct and not necessarily transmission
mechanisms flowing between business strategies and employment relations outcomes.
Similarly, Standing (2014) outlines the manner in which a labour ‘precariat’ has
emerged from the diffusion of neo-liberal economic policies based on de-regulation,
marketisation and privatisation. Within neo-liberalism employees (such as those at
the AA) may find themselves in minimal trust relationships with capital and the state
and where subordination degrades implicit contracts with employees and associated
labour security.
Cushen and Thompson (2016) and Clark and Macey (2015) outline how the
presence of financialisation raises further theoretical challenges which the research
questions posed in this article seek to address. First, as a specific development in the
broader political economy of employment relations, how (beyond inference) are the
contagion effects of financialisation evident in firms transmitted into workplace out-
comes and worker experiences? Second, to develop the theoretical and empirical
evaluation of financialisation, it is necessary to sub-divide its effects into ‘profit’
financialisation, and ‘control’ financialisation. Heyes et al. (2014) use aggregate data
to demonstrate the diffusion of ‘profit’ and ‘control’ financialisation. Generally, profit
financialisation refers to the growth in the profit share of the financial sector in accor-
dance with the arguments of Krippner (2011). However, more specifically for Heyes
et al. (2014), the category refers to the growing role of financial transactions in the ap-
propriation of value within financialised firms beyond the financial sector. In contrast
to this control financialisation refers to the imposition of managerial strategies de-
signed to appropriate value from a workforce with the aim of securing profit
financialisation, for example, dis-regarding collective bargaining agreements,
downsizing followed by work intensification and sometimes out-sourcing. In other
words, in firms which embrace financialisation or have financialisation imposed on
them, these are the transmission mechanisms that feed through and shape employment
relations outcomes which must be evaluated and measured.
A focus on the contagion effects of financialisation in a non-financial firm such as
the AA and its established patterns of employment relations is a central objective of
this contribution where the theoretical framework goes beyond an isolated discussion
of firm level developments as ‘financialisation’. Owner investors do reinforce the im-
peratives and priorities of financial capitalism and the associated appropriation of
value but weaken the relations of ownership and stakeholder interests therein.
Financialisation is theorised as contagious but also as a measure of the extent to
which finance has moved beyond its established role as a provider of capital in man-
agerial capitalism. It follows from this that the theoretical and empirical advances of
this contribution are threefold. First, it goes beyond those who have emphasised
market forces, for example, Blackburn (2006: 41) where labour outcomes are inferred
to merely flow from financialised market forces. Rather it is necessary to demonstrate
that the forces which promote short-termism are not a reification—market forces—
but real investor-owner actors. Intermediary financial actors such as hedge funds,
private equity funds and sovereign wealth funds diffuse new business models and
appropriate productivity gains made in firms re-distributing these gains to investors,
shareholders and other investor-owners. This approach to the ownership and© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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investors.
A second contribution derives from the framework which distinguishes between
profit financialisation and its contagion effects in control financialisation. By develo-
ping the distinction between profit and control financialisation this contribution
builds on Mazzucato’s (2013) discussion of disincentives to innovation, technological
diffusion and investment in human capital, that is, the key determinants of productiv-
ity. The key contribution here is that the disincentive effects of contagion are created
by investor-owner actors who concentrate on the appropriation of value and its distri-
bution among a small group of investor-owners leaving less retained profit for further
investment in innovation.
Third, a key structural change in contemporary capitalism diffused by not only
financialised owner-investors but also the management class in listed firms more gen-
erally is the use of share buy-backs to raise the share price of a firm and increase po-
tential dividend payments to investors and shareholders. So whilst we concentrate on
the role of owner-investors it is important to recognise that for some the distinction
between national models of managerial capitalism and a globally focussed model of
financial capitalism is less significant than the diffusion of practices such as share
buy-backs. Lazonick (2014), for example, has consistently argued that the manage-
ment class in listed firms pioneered the use of share-buy backs; therefore the practice
cannot be associated exclusively with financial capitalism and investor-owners. The
argument developed here is that owner-investors and their fund managers profit from
re-producing the investor and shareholder value ideology, ‘bench marking’ firms
against the best performers across sectors (Nölke and Perry, 2007). Here a key contri-
bution we make is to identify financial estimates of transmission mechanisms to
labour outcomes associated with this benchmarking which necessarily impose on
the employment relationship. Hence the overall value-added contribution of this
framework is that the financialisation of the firm has a profit dimension centred on
the appropriation and distribution of value and a control dimension focussed on
employment relations, a key source of appropriated value. Table 1 summarises these
contributions and the two research questions.
3 RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES
This project has been on-going since 2007 and has followed the GMB in its relation-
ship with the AA and its private equity owners since then. The research reported in
this article commenced in autumn 2013 when access was secured to the GMB AA
archive.1 It examines the consequences of union de-recognition for the GMB, pre-
parations by the current owners for the re-listing of the AA on the London stock
exchange and the impact of this on the AA workforce and the GMB membership
in particular. The research design took the form of mixed research methods and the
utilisation of multiple research sources in an effort to accurately position the GMBs
arguments and claims in a broader historical context.
The project utilised five inter-related methods combined with three additional
sources of material. First, access to GMB-AA archive held at its Chessington1 Because the research utilises archive and documentary sources whilst the Harvard reference system is used
throughout documentary and archive sources are cited separately and are pre-ﬁxed with a source, e.g.
GMB, Certiﬁcation Ofﬁce etc. and listed in alphabetical order in the end list of references.
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1999, before the arrival of new private equity investor-owners, through until 2015.
In effect the archive represented a central primary source because it contained corre-
spondence with the GMB head office in Euston, the GMB legal team, the IDU under
its original name of the AA Democratic Union, GMB members and the AA owners.
The archive also contains a library of press and media clippings and recordings on the
AA and its changing membership. Finally, the archive contains details of the GMB
campaign at the AA and examples of publicity material for this campaign. Once an
accurate narrative had been developed from this source it was possible to turn to
the second method of data capture and confirmation.
Interviews were conducted with the GMB General Secretary, National organiser,
Southern region senior organiser and GMB national legal officer. These interviews
were supplemented by face-to-face and follow-up telephone interviews with GMB
lay officials who continue to represent GMB members as individuals in Liverpool,
Manchester, Leicester and Birmingham and used to clarify the material from the
GMB archive. Third, the interviews were supplemented by participation observation
at the GMB national congress and in meetings between GMB officials and GMB sup-
ported Members of Parliament in the shadow Business Innovation and Skills depart-
ment before the recent general election. This participation provided an insight into the
extent to which GMB policy on private equity was informed and driven by experience
at the AA and the extent to which this fed into policy formulation by the Labour op-
position. One of the MPs also agreed to an interview and discussion on private equity
ownership and employee interests more generally. Fourth, interviews were conducted
with three private equity entrepreneurs familiar with the Permira buy-out of the AA.
In total twenty five useable interviews were completed. Fifth, the AAs Base Prospec-
tus for an initial public offering of shares issued to potential investors in June 2013
provided details on outline cost control measures to be introduced after the share© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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including the Certification Office on-line service, employment tribunal judgements
and the IDU website. To balance the very open access secured at the GMB it was nec-
essary to seek to secure some formal access at the IDU. This aspiration proved trou-
blesome and problematic: IDU officials repeatedly declined to engage with the study
and eventually declined to take phone calls or respond to email inquiries. Accordingly
analysis of the IDU has been restricted to references to their website and through the
returns of the certification officer.
4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This part of the article provides an account of what the financialisation of a business
means on the ground for workers and managers. It builds on some of the material in
an earlier study (Clark, 2011) which can now be referred to as the AA part one. The
article presents new empirical findings within a theoretical framework which may be
useful to accommodate further cases of firm level financialisation and the potential
for transmission mechanisms between this and labour outcomes.
4.1 The ﬁnancialisation of the AA
The AA was founded as a mutual business and remained so until members voted to
de-mutualise in a decision which was quickly followed by the AAs sale to Centrica,
the British Gas holding company in 1999. Five years later the AA passed into private
equity backed ownership and in 2007 the firm was merged with Saga whereupon its
ownership was re-formatted under the title of Acromas Holdings. In 2014 the AA
and Saga were de-merged with both firms re-listed on the London Stock Exchange.
The cost of the de-merger and all associated flotation costs were placed on the AA
balance sheet. This marked the beginning of financialisation at firm level. The owner-
ship structure employed by the AA private equity owners—the limited partnership—
enabled them to become the firm’s new investor owners via a change of majority
shareholder and continue to run the firm as it was before they acquired it. This
allowed the new owner to place any costs associated with its acquisition of the firm
and any further costs associated with any re-structure on the balance sheet of the busi-
ness. Debts associated with leverage and any loans or dividend payments to them-
selves, consultancy fees and accumulated debt interest can be charged to the
portfolio firm (the AA) which Acromas holdings owned. That is, the AA was mined
for returns to investors and shareholders and then charged for the direct and in-direct
costs of this appropriation of value. The original purchase by private equity partner-
ships CVC and Permira was highly leveraged with loans of £1.3 billion or 75% of the
£1.75 billion purchase price secured against AA assets. The following year the owners
increased their loans by a further £1billion 50% of which they appropriated as an in-
terim payment. Two years later in 2007 Acromas holdings funded the merger of the
AA and Saga via a re-financing deal which resulted in £4.8 billion of debt on the
AA/Saga balance sheet. Three billion pounds was used to buy back existing debt at
the AA and Saga whilst the remainder of the debt was used to make a further interim
payment to management and private equity investors in Acromas. In June 2014
Acromas de-merged the AA and Saga and re-financed AA debt with a further £3
billion loan secured against AA assets and future revenue streams. A management
team at the AA bought 70% of the firm with backing from ten City fund managers
for approximately £1 billion to fund an accelerated stock market listing valued at© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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balance sheet was roughly twice the value of its listing valuation. In March 2015
the AA announced plans to raise a further £1billion to help improve its finances
and repay ‘PIKs’ (payment in kind) notes in an effort to reduce annual financing
interest costs of £195 million. In June 2015 the AAs market capitalisation value was
£2.32 billion.
Mutual firms are based on the principle of mutuality where members derive their
rights to profits and votes via a customer relationship not via the contribution of
capital to the firm in the form of direct investment. Funds raised by mutual firms pro-
vide services to members of the firm and because there are no external shareholders
these firms do not have to maximise investor and shareholder value. Therefore profits
can be re-invested and used for internal financing. So in less than 100years the AA
went from a service based mutual firm to a highly geared and leveraged financialised
firm where its debts are greater than its current stock market valuation.
4.2 Impact on AA employees
The impact of the AAs financialisation on its employees was that loans and the
re-financing of existing loans were secured against AA assets and future revenue
streams, for example all AA vehicles and associated equipment were sold and leased
back by the firm. Moreover, in addition to the loans themselves the firm has to ser-
vice interest payments on the loans which the firm has had to re-finance on a regular
basis. Both the principal debt and the interest burden place huge cost pressures on the
business.
As reported in Clark (2011), the GMB was de-recognised soon after the firm was
acquired by private equity in 2005. It is however, worth summarising this develop-
ment here to provide full contextual setting for more recent developments. The AA
helped set up an in-house trade union called the AADU—the Automobile Associa-
tion Democratic Union which both the firm and the AADU’s leadership claimed
was a reversion to the AAs original trade union representation the AASA (GMB
archive item 1, henceforth GMB1). The Automobile Association Staff association
was originally an independent group affiliated to what is now the GMB union and
subsequently became a part of the union via a transfer of engagement agreement
between APEX—the association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer
Staff which later became part of the GMB. AADU publicity materials clearly state
that the AADU is effectively a re-formatted AASA (GMB 2) and in March 2005
the AA human resources director de-recognised the GMB in a letter sent to the
GMB regional secretary (GMB 3). The AADU was immediately recognised after this
by the AA (GMB 4).
This research reports on later correspondence between the certification office for
trade unions and employers’ associations and the GMB where the certification office
operations manager confirmed that they had received an application from the AADU
for entry into the certification officer’s list of trade unions. More significantly the
operations manager made it clear that
‘entry on the list of trade unions would mean that the body concerned meets the deﬁnition of a trade
union within section 2 of the Trade Union Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992 (as amended). It
does not mean that such a union is an independent trade union within the meaning of the 1992 Act’.
Further, ‘Once a union is on the list of trade unions, it may then apply for a certiﬁcate of indepen-
dence, which, if granted would be conclusive evidence, in law, that it is an independent trade union’
(GMB 5)© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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coordinator who was employed by the AA but worked full-time for the GMB both
defected to the AADU informing GMB members that their membership had reverted
to the former AASA. This move secured funding for the AADU in the form of GMB
account balances and cheque books whereas further short-term funding was secured
as the AA paid union subscriptions for membership of the AADU for the first year
of its full recognition. In 2005 the GMB had 10,000 members at the AA or roughly
70% union density.
Within a month of recognising the AADU investor-owners commenced a re-struc-
ture by initiating a performance management programme via letters sent to all patrol
staff informing them that they will be placed in one of two categories; those meeting
or exceeding expectation and those whose performance does not meet expectations.
Patrol staff who met expectations were awarded a £2,000 bonus. Those who did
not were called to one-to-one roadside meetings without representation from the
AADU or the GMB and offered £18,000 to leave the AA or accept placement on
an improvement programme which would lead to summary dismissal if they did
not accept this change to their terms and conditions to which the AADU had agreed
(GMB 6).
Through this process 3,400 patrol workers (50% of the patrol force) left the firm.
These departures were not redundancies but voluntary resignations recorded on an
AA RSS Patrol decision form. In the decision box AA employees are given two op-
tions: either ‘I wish to accept a mutual termination of my employment’ or ‘I wish
to continue my employment with the AA as an RSS patrol’, (GMB 7). In addition
these resignations were covered by an ‘authority to advise on compromise agree-
ments’ (GMB 8).
‘I hereby authorise xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx to advise me regarding the compromise agreement between my-
self and the AA. I understand the rules of the union representation/advice in connection with this com-
promise agreement is given by the AADU national secretary or representative nominated by the AADU
national secretary on condition that 1, I will remain a member of the AADU and continue to pay the
normal contribution rate whilst the proceedings continue and 2, I will cooperate fully with the represen-
tative nominated by the AADU, act upon their advice and provide as far as possible, all relevant infor-
mation. I understand that if I fail to comply with condition or wilfully provide false information to the
union or my representative, representation may be withdrawn by the AADU’
The £18,000 exit award was far lower than those previously agreed between the
now de-recognised GMB union and the AA which on average could see a patrol
worker retire or take voluntary redundancy with a payment of around £30,000 and
in some cases up to £50,000 for long serving workers.
The GMB AA archive and interviews with the GMB regional organisers revealed
that further performance innovations are regularly introduced. Patrol improvement
notices represent a further refinement of the performance management system and
can lead to immediate dismissal if patrol staffs fail to meet the performance require-
ments of these notices. In interviews it became clear that these developments were a
mechanism to encourage employees to transfer status to self-employed drivers. The
firm also intensified working by the introduction of the ‘last job of shift’ which could
significantly lengthen a workers shift. ‘Last jobs’ can be called within the final thirty
minutes of an eight hour shift which can potentially lengthen working time by as
much as a further five hours. Third, the firm introduced 195 annual ‘standby hours’
which in-effect equate to unpaid overtime. These individual developments were re-
cently rolled-up into new contracts which cut core earnings but insert incentives for© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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incentives for sales commissions, for example on membership up-grades.
Whilst remaining de-recognised in 2016, the GMB retains over 800 members in the
AAs current workforce of 4,000, giving it a density of 20%. The majority of these
members work in the patrol service where 2,300 workers are currently employed.
Although the GMB aim is to secure re-recognition this may prove hard to secure
other than if patrol workers are taken as an initial bargaining unit which would give
the GMB an approximate density of 30%. Interviews with GMB lay representatives
revealed that patrol recovery drivers are the fastest returning group of workers to
GMB membership precisely because they are the group most affected by contractual
changes agreed to by the AADU. Employees nearing retirement age have been
returning to the GMB in large number because of concerns about performance man-
agement measures and the potential impact of improvement notices on pension pay
outs. The GMB has scored regular successes in employment tribunal cases where
the union represented AA workers as individuals and has now secured the right under
the Employment Relations Act 1999 for GMB shop stewards to represent union
members on individual issues which the AA previously denied them. Under the
Employment Relations Act employees have the right to be accompanied to grievance
or disciplinary hearings by an official who is employed by a trade union, an official
who is certified by a trade union or a workplace colleague. The AA agreed that its
position that AA workers could not be accompanied by a certified GMB representative
did not reflect the procedural position laid out in legislation. The union has won
employment tribunal cases on the grounds of employer termination decisions on
grounds of disability and unfair dismissal in the case of an employee who raised
concerns about the re-structuring programme at the AA. Since flotation the AA has
been headed by a new chief executive, who previously headed a rival car recovery
service Green Flag, a business run on a franchise model. Interviews with the GMB
national organiser, senior southern region organiser and regional organisers suggest
that this model may be one that the new management team may seek to diffuse at
the AA, that is, retreat from an employment based model to one of self-employment.
One private equity interviewee whose Better Capital private Equity partnership
applied this model at the now defunct City Link parcel delivery firm suggested that
this model could easily be applied at the AA yielding significant cost savings (X1).4.3 What about the independent democratic union?
As noted it proved impossible to secure access to IDU officials or indeed to speak to
any IDU members at the AA. Every employee interviewed was asked if they were a
member of the IDU but none of our interviewees admitted to being members of the
union. The IDU has sole recognition for collective bargaining at the AA and the cer-
tification office granted the union a certificate of independence ten years ago (certifi-
cation office 1). The certification office data base also records that the AA and related
organisations such as AA windshields, AA contact centres, is the only organisation
where the IDU has collective bargaining recognition. For example, the 2013 annual
return form for a trade union (form AR21, page 3) record that the AA payroll is
the major source of funding for the IDU and that it had 5,699 members. This is the
case even though on its website the IDU claims to represent employees in a number
of other organisations including the British School of Motoring, Halfords, the NHS
(particularly overseas workers), ‘Care Workers’, Saga and ‘others’ (IDU.org.uk).© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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the IDU is ‘committed to acting for you as an individual and representing your inter-
ests’ (idu.org.uk NHS section menu). IDU legal services on disciplinary and grievance
matters, re-structuring, redundancy, changes to pay systems and shift rosters, pay,
bullying and harassment, personal injury and discrimination are provided through a
private firm of solicitors. Essentially the IDU operates on a service model beyond
the AA and is not recognised for the purpose of collective bargaining at any employer
which is not part of the AA group.
The IDU and the AA are both located in the same post code area of Basingstoke
and previously both occupied a common address. It follows from these limitations
that all the material on the IDU has been gathered from official sources such as the
certification office and the IDU website. For more background detail on the IDU
see Clark (2011:44). Failure to secure to access to the IDU is significant for two rea-
sons; first, what might be described as ‘dead-ended’ pursuits of access such as this one
reveal much about the process of financialisation at the AA. Without the support of
the IDU via its endorsement of the re-structure initiated by new owner-management
the returns recorded for investors would not have been forthcoming. It is interesting
therefore that the IDU officials who are integral to the process of financialisation at
the AA have chosen not to give their side of the story particularly as the union regu-
larly receives criticism from the GMB on its AA web page and in interviews with its
officials. A second reason why the stance of the IDU is significant relates to metho-
dology. Denials of access should no longer be seen merely as a denial of access from
which researchers move on but rather they are a source of contextual information in
themselves. That is, it is more likely to be the case that denials of access relate less to
how busy a hoped for interview contact is but that these contacts prefer not to have
probing questions put to them.5 DISCUSSION
Our discussion focuses on two questions: de-recognition of the GMB and its decision
to continue to resource efforts to organise the AA. On the first research question of
de-recognition there are two issues; one micro and one macro. The micro issue is fully
reported on in this research and is very clear. For the majority of its existence the AA
was a mutual and therefore did not fully embrace I&SHV approaches to manage-
ment, not even under Centrica’s ownership from 1999 to 2005. Rather like the John
Lewis partnership until 2005, the AA’s partnership model ensured that the financial
success of the business was evenly distributed to a wide range of stake holders not just
investors. As one of our private equity interviewees made clear the AA was ‘ripe for
picking’ ‘it had a cosy relationship with its workforce and a large property portfolio’
(quotes from interview with private equity partner Y). The GMB national organiser
made clear the AA was a ‘good employer’. Therefore the AA was ripe for picking
and downsizing if new investor-owners could rapidly re-structure the firm and legiti-
mise this via a union endorsement. This was unlikely under GMB recognition and
that is why new investor-owners and one GMB official colluded to create the AADU
which morphed into the IDU on the basis that both replaced the GMB by reversion
to the AASA. Many GMB members accepted this in good faith and further accepted
the exit payments which they thought had been negotiated by the GMB. Nearly all
the 3,400 patrol staff who voluntarily left the firm this way held GMB membership
so since 2005 it is remarkable that 800 AA workers have retained GMB membership© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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archive establishes that the AADU was recognised before it secured a certificate of in-
dependence which supports GMB claims that the AADU was a ‘scab union’ setup
and funded by AA management (see Clark, 2011). As documented the GMB national
organiser repeated these claims as ‘fair comment’ on television and in newspaper ar-
ticles and has never been challenged by any of the AAs new owners. Hence it is clear
that these arguments and claims are not issues which the owners of the AA have
disputed in the past.
The macro issue in the wider political economy is one which this research touches
on tangentially; because private equity backed buy-outs of firms are classed as a
change of majority shareholder rather than a transfer of undertaking tupe regula-
tions—transfer of undertakings protection of employment does not apply. So in this
case it is as though a new management team has decided to de-recognise the GMB
rather than a new investor-ownership team owning the firm. The latter is the case
even though a succession of new investor-owners has both managed and owned the
firm, often the same investors under different ownership names. Under the leadership
of Vince Cable the Department of Business Innovation and Skills did produce some
research (BIS/Kay 2014) into the nature of this situation. In summary the sale of a
majority of the shares in a firm to a single ownership entity such as a private equity
investor gives the new owner the opportunity to de-list the firm and run it as a private
entity and or re-list the business at a later date. In addition to this any new ownership
entity is able to pursue strategic and operational decisions in a manner which over
writes agreements made between previous owners and employees and avoid falling
foul of tupe regulations because in theory the business remains intact.
Why does the GMB continue to devote considerable resources to the AA? Docu-
ments in the archive reveal that a dispute resulting from personal rivalry and disagree-
ment led to the defection of key GMB leaders to the AADU. In 2004 when the AA
was purchased by the private equity firms CVC and Permira the GMB southern
region senior organiser who represented AA members quickly developed a relation-
ship with these new owners. At about the same time as this a GMB post for southern
region regional secretary became vacant. The southern region senior organiser applied
for this post, was interviewed but another candidate was chosen for the job. Soon after
this the southern region national organiser left the AA under a compromise agreement
with a £41,000 golden handshake (GMB 10). Two weeks later the same individual
assumed the post of general secretary of the forerunner to the IDU the AADU which
witnessed the narrative detailed earlier in this article. Here the GMB failed to act fast
enough to prevent this move and was out manoeuvred by one of their own staff who
has remained the IDUs general secretary since 2005 (Certification Office annual return
forms, AR21, 2006–13). As the national organiser argued in several interviews ‘he
rubber stamped the re-structure out of spite and sold his members down the river’. This
argument was ‘stood-up’ by many returning GMB members; however, it has proved
impossible to get the IDU perspective on the re-structure. The IDU general secretary
rarely speaks to the media but in 2010 did so following a strike ballot at the AA over
pension reforms which was eventually settled voluntarily, (Independent, 2010). It fol-
lows from this that the argument that the IDU has done nothing for the AA workforce
cannot be supported 100%.
By addressing these research questions the theoretical framework outlined in part
one of the article identifies three contributions which this research can make to the
evaluation of financialisation at the workplace and its transmission to employment© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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ductivity gains. First, once in control of the firm, the new investor-owners, to secure
the dividend payments for themselves with the agreement of the AADU, instigated a
drastic downsizing programme which witnessed 3,400 patrol workers voluntarily
leave the business. An alternative way to evaluate these exits is that workers were per-
formance managed out of the business on the basis of the RSS patrol decision form
which massaged these exits as mutual decisions. Many patrol workers revealed that
they were confused by the AADU endorsement of this form; because they had been
told that the AADU developed out of the GMB but had reverted back to the original
title and bargaining unit around the AASA. Workplace exits via the RSS form
resulted in patrol workers jobs being potentially subject to up to 50% work intensifi-
cation but the value of this and the value of exit cost savings (redundancy packages
agreed by the GMB minus £18,000 in the first round and £16,000 in the second
round) were not re-invested back into the firm. Rather, they have been appropriated
by investor-owner rentiers and re-imposed back on the re-listed business as balance
sheet debts.
Work intensification was manifest in several ways—from 2008 50% fewer patrols
attempted to manage the call load. In a monthly audio tape ‘on patrol’ the AAs then
chief executive admitted that the firm had cut too many jobs leaving many AA mem-
bers who had broken down stranded. This resulted in sustained complaints from AA
members as roadside waiting times escalated beyond two hours. These points are re-
peated and further detailed in the Independent Newspaper (2006), where in addition
to these details on the effects of labour downsizing at the AA an AA spokesman for
chief executive Tim Parker stated, that the downsizing had the support of a new ‘staff
association’ which replaced the GMB. Another way in which work intensification be-
came clear was the innovation of last job of shift and the 195 standby hours of free
overtime. Last job of shift callouts extend working time whereas standby hours
equate to approximately four hours per week unpaid overtime and often come to-
gether in a last job of shift. The finding that investor-owners seek to appropriate value
for themselves and their investors at the expense of firm level stakeholders such as la-
bour is generalisable beyond this case. The key point of scrutiny which advances
generalisable knowledge is identification of how such embrace creates a potential
transmission mechanism from profits and returns to investors to employment rela-
tions and the labour process. We contend that the new investor-owners strategise
these transmission mechanisms in their business strategy but are not always able to
enact them in the manner they were implemented in this case. Neither are investor-
owners subject to such sustained resistance as in this case.
A second contribution relates to how this appropriation affects investment in
training and development. Two examples serve to demonstrate this case. The regional
organiser raised the lack of training for VRS (vehicle recovery system) winches a mat-
ter on which he received regular representation from patrol staff. The AA ordered
modification to these systems (which subsequently the Health and Safety executive
ruled were unlawful because they breached manufacturer guidelines which in turn
invalidated AA insurance for patrol drivers). The regional organiser reported that
VRS training did not cover these modifications. Patrol drivers reported that this
modification included replacing a steel winch rope with a fibre one which had snapped
on several occasions damaging vehicles and potentially causing serious whiplash inju-
ries to operatives. Operatives were not trained to deal with this modification neither
were they warned about the snap hazard (GMB 9). A further example of forthcoming© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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the AA will secure ‘headcount reductions’ and closures of customer contact centres
ahead of its share float. As a demonstration of the transmission mechanism from the
financialisation of the business through to labour outcomes the prospectus anticipates
problems with staff morale flowing from these economies, a deterioration in customer
service and the efficiency of AA patrol operations following the introduction of these
controls on training costs (AA, 2013: 24). That is, following the further financialisation
of the business.
A third contribution attempts to measure the transmission mechanism between the
financialisation of the business and labour outcomes. Here a simple calculation estab-
lishes the point. Transfers from employees via breaches of implicit contracts on re-
dundancy terms to investor-owners made a major contribution to the first dividend
re-capitalisation taken out of the firm by its rentier owners of approximately
£409,000,000 in 2005. Three thousand and four hundred patrol workers left the AA
via voluntary exit, if they all received £18,000 to do so the exercise cost the firm
£61,200,000; however, these exit costs were lower than what patrol staff would have
received under the GMB collective agreement. Before de-recognition £30,000 was
the average payment that the AA budgeted for in cases of redundancy, therefore to
downsize patrol staff by 3,400 would have cost the firm £102,000,000 netting the
new investor-owners around £40,800,000. The £30,000 for average collectively agreed
redundancy payments is likely to be an under estimate but the GMB archive does not
contain accurate exit salary information. Hence as an estimate £40,800,000 represents
profit financialisation appropriated and re-distributed to investor-owners and in turn
those who invested in these private equity funds. Subsequent re-capitalisations have
been added to the balance sheet of AA/Saga and latterly since floatation the AA to
repeat this type of appropriation.6 CONCLUSION
These points lead to three specific conclusions. First, the sustained exclusion of the
GMB, even though the union retains a substantial membership density at the AA,
has helped promote an accommodation between the investor-owners and the IDU.
Second, the manner in which the recognised union, the IDU, has endorsed a text book
example of restructuring under the private equity business model questions the inde-
pendence of the IDUs status, if not as a union as an oppositional body in the work-
place. Third, as part of their drive to a re-listing on the stock exchange investor-
owners have imposed significant work intensification, performance management
and required revenue generation on the workforce. The imposition of control
financialisation measures such as these are direct transmission mechanisms to em-
ployment relations outcomes enabling the owners to appropriate value from the busi-
ness but impose the cost of this on the AA balance sheet and its workforce going
forward. This figure stood at £2.7 billion in spring 2015 built on a debt to earnings
ratio of 6.9% on flotation—an unusually high leverage figure for a recently listed
firm. This is a measure of the contagion effect of financialisation in a non-financial
firm and a significant factor in making jobs at the AA precarious.
Whilst the AA remains a going concern its financialisation clearly makes the status
of jobs precarious. In many other cases similar to this one a portfolio firm that is
either returned to the stock market after a private equity re-structure or which is sub-
ject to a private equity sponsored re-structure may go into administration. This is so© 2016 The Author. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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dermines the business model, for example City Link Parcels or Jessop’s cameras. This
may or may not be a possibility at the AA. Rather more likely is the possibility that
the imposition of a franchise business model will reduce employee status at the AA
further still.References
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